Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal
Volume 6 | Number 2
The 2020 Survey on Oil & Gas
October 2020

Recent Case Decisions

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas,
and Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Recent Case Decisions, 6 OIL & GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 335 (2020),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss2/28

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal by an authorized editor of
University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact LawLibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

Oklahoma Oil and Gas, Natural
Resources, and Energy Journal
RECENT CASE DECISIONS

Vol. VI, No. II

October, 2020
Table of Contents

OIL AND GAS ........................................................................................ 336
Upstream ....................................................................................... 336
Downstream................................................................................... 337
WATER .................................................................................................. 340
Federal .......................................................................................... 340
State.............................................................................................. 342
LAND .................................................................................................... 346
Easement ....................................................................................... 346
Other Use ...................................................................................... 347
ELECTRICITY ......................................................................................... 350
Rate ............................................................................................... 350
TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS ................................................................ 352
Corporations ................................................................................. 352
Patents / Intellectual Property ........................................................ 353
ENVIRONMENTAL .................................................................................. 354
Federal .......................................................................................... 354
State .............................................................................................. 358

335

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

336

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 6

OIL AND GAS
Upstream
Ctr. For Envtl. Law and Policy v. State Dep’t of Ecology, 468 P.3d 1064
(Wash. 2020).
The Respondents, Center for Environmental Law and Policy (“Center”),
brought suit against Petitioners, Department of Ecology (“Ecology”), to
challenge the validity of Ecology’s summer minimum instream flow rate
rule, alleging Ecology exceeded its authority with an arbitrary and
capricious rule and failed to fulfill its public trust responsibilities, and then
moved to supplement the record. The trial court denied the motion to
supplement and dismissed the challenge to Ecology’s rule validity. The
Court of Appeals affirmed rejection of the motion the supplement and the
public trust argument but invalidated the rule, holding Ecology had
exceeded its authority. Ecology appealed to the Washington Supreme
Court. The court asserted the Washington Administrative Procedure Act
places the burden of asserting an administrative rule’s invalidity on the
challenger. Subject to de novo review, the rule may only be invalidated if it
is (1) unconstitutional, (2) is outside the statutory authority of the agency,
(3) is arbitrary of capricious, or (4) was adopted without complying with
statutory rule making procedures. Center asserted the rule was arbitrary and
capricious; they argued Ecology failed to consider statutory recreational,
navigational, and aesthetic values when setting the rule. The court held the
challenge fails under the plain language of the statute in question because
the record shows Ecology did consider those values–and in fact set a rate
that sustains recreation and navigation–but even if they did not, the statute
only provides guidelines and not required elements. The court held that
Center failed to meet its burden showing Ecology exceeded its authority by
setting an arbitrary and capricious rule and thus reversed the Court of
Appeals invalidation of Ecology’s rule.
Slawson Expl. Co., v. Nine Point Energy, LLC, 966 F.3d 775 (8th Cir.
2020).
Exploration Company and Production Company entered into an
exploration and development agreement (EDA) to drill and develop in an
area of North Dakota. Included in the EDA was a Promote Obligation to
pay an additional 10% of Production Company’s costs in electing to drill.
Production Company later filed for bankruptcy. Exploration Company filed
for a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding claiming the Promote
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Obligation was not subject to discharge. The bankruptcy court allowed
Exploration Company to commence litigation on the issue. Exploration
Company filed a declaratory action against Production Company claiming
the Promote Obligation (1) is a covenant that runs with the land, (2) an
equitable servitude, or (3) is a real property interest. The district court
granted Production Company’s motion for summary judgment. Exploration
Company failed to demonstrate that the Promote Obligation ran with the
land. Covenants that run with the land must directly benefit the land, and
because the Promote Obligation is a cost that personally benefits the
Exploration Company and the cost was not directly tied back into
benefiting the land, it, therefore, did not directly benefit the land. Second,
Exploration Company contended the Promote Obligation was an equitable
servitude, because it had many similarities of an easement by estoppel. An
equitable servitude and an easement by estoppel have similar characteristics
but had different elements a Promote Obligation could not satisfy. Third,
Exploration Company contended that an overriding royalty interest,
recognized as a real property interest, and a Promote Obligation are the
same except for different payment periods. The Ninth Circuit held royalties
operate as profits issuing out of the land. Because drilling was not
necessarily profiting out of the land, it could not be considered a real
property interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court.
Downstream
Total E&P USA, Inc. v. Marubeni Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 19-20271,
2020 WL 4460002 (5th Cir. Jul. 31, 2020).
Operator-1 filed three lawsuits seeking declaratory judgment against
Operator-2 after the bankruptcy court deemed Operator-1 liable for
Operator-3’s abandonment costs associated with three interrelated assets, a
pipeline, and two oil and gas fields. During bankruptcy court proceedings,
Operator-3’s creditors pledged proceeds from one half of the overriding
royalty interest to Operator-2, reducing Operator-3’s abandonment liability.
Before filing, Operator-1 assigned interest in all assets to Operator-3.
Operator-2 removed all cases to federal court. Parties cross-motioned for
summary judgment on liability for two out of three cases. The third case is
pending in district court. On summary judgment, Operator-1 asserted the
assignment of interest to Operator-3 relieved Operator-1’s liability for
abandonment costs. Both trial courts found Operator-1 jointly and severally
liable and granted partial summary judgment for Operator-2. The trial
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courts both entered judgment for Operator-2, awarding Operator-2 damages
subtracted by the value of the royalty interest. Operator-2 motioned for
judgment as a matter of law and to alter the judgment related to the royalty
interest. The court denied Operator-2’s combined motion. Both parties
appealed, and Operator-1 motioned for consolidation of appeals. On appeal,
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated both appeals and looked to
both assets’ operating agreements. The court reversed the trial court’s
judgment for Operator-2 on case one, holding that the operating agreement
contained an express provision that relieved Operator-1’s liability.
Conversely, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for Operator-2 on
case two, holding absent an express provision, like one in case one,
Operator-1 remained liable for Operator-3’s abandonment costs. Further,
the court affirmed the denial of Operator-2’s motion, allowing a royalty
interest setoff to Operator-1’s liability. This is an unpublished opinion of
the court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the
case as precedent.
Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 2020 WL
4582196 (5th Cir. 2020).
In 2013, several Louisiana Parishes (“Parishes”) sued several Oil and
Gas Companies (“Companies”) seeking relief under the Louisiana State and
Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (“SLCRMA”).
SLCRMA required anyone who wished to start using Louisiana’s coastal
zone for any activity significantly impacting coastal waters to apply for a
permit. However, SLCRMA’s grandfather clause did not require anyone
already legally using the coastal zone, prior to SLCRMA’s enactment, to
have a permit. Parishes alleged Companies continued use of coastal zone
canals and wells, built prior to SLCRMA, violates SLCRMA and the
grandfather clause did not apply.
Companies initially tried to remove the case; however, the district courts
denied their motion. After Parishes expert report, Companies tried to
remove the case for a second time. This time, Companies claimed first
notice of federal question jurisdiction as Parishes’ expert report indicated
Parishes sued Companies for use of wells and canals built during World
War II when Companies were under a federal wartime agency, the
Petroleum Administration for War. Parishes moved to remand.
The Eastern and Western Districts of Louisiana granted Parishes’ motion
to remand. Companies appealed the remand. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the remand because Companies filed notice of removal
too late. The court held Companies’ first notice of a federal question did not
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come from Parishes’ expert report. Initial notice came from a previous
report filed by Parishes with the court long before initiation of this suit and
Parishes’ expert report merely repeated that same information about the
wells violating SLCRMA. The court affirmed the remand motions.
Cline v. Sunoco, Inc. (R&M), et al., No. CIV-17-313-JAG, 2020 WL
4748026 (E.D. Okla. August 17, 2020).
A class of Royalty Owners sought compensatory and punitive damages
against Fuel Distributor for unpaid interest accrued on late royalty
payments. Royalty Owners sued under theories of breach of statutory
obligation to pay interest and fraud. Fuel Distributor disputed class
certification based upon an inability to identify an accurate list of affected
Royalty Owners and Royalty Owners’ individual damages. The class was
maintained because Royalty Owners’ expert witness sufficiently
determined the members of the class and their respective interest owed.
Trial court found that Fuel Distributor’s expert witness’s untimely
completion of their report sufficiently burdened Royalty Owners’ expert
witness and warranted striking Fuel Distributor’s expert witness’s
testimony. Trial court also found that Fuel Distributor breached their
statutory obligation to pay interest by routinely withholding interest owed
under Oklahoma’s Production Revenue Standards Act (“PRSA”) unless it
was requested by Royalty Owner. Interest begins to accrue and compound
at the default rate of 12% upon the date the royalty payment is due. Fuel
Distributor contended that they were only subject to the 6% rate applicable
in circumstances where title to royalties is not marketable. Trial court
rejected this argument because marketability is irrelevant once Fuel
Distributor has made an initial payment. Fuel Distributor further argued that
Royalty Owners with unclaimed payments should be excluded. Trial court
rejected this argument because paying the state the unclaimed funds
amounts to paying a third party on behalf of the Royalty Owner. Trial court
rejected Royalty Owners’ fraud claim because they failed to show reliance
upon the information contained within Fuel Distributor’s payments. Trial
court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. Punitive damages
were warranted under both the Energy Litigation Reform Act (“ELRA”)
and Oklahoma’s punitive damages statute because of Fuel Distributor’s
intentional unwillingness to pay the statutorily required interest.
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WATER
Federal
Schmucker v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-1593 JD, 2020 WL
4593867 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2020)
A manufacturing facility contaminated the soil, groundwater, and indoor
air of a nearby residential neighborhood. The company operating the
manufacturing facility connected the exposed houses to the city waterline
and installed vapor mitigation systems when it became aware of the
contamination. Residents of the neighborhood brought suit against the
manufacturing facility claiming the company was in violation of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and that the contamination could
endanger their environment and health. The Northern District Court of
Indiana had previously ruled on the violation claim, granting summary
judgement and turned to the endangerment claim at bench trial. The only
disputed element of the endangerment claim was whether imminent and
substantial endangerment was present to health or environment. The
residents claimed that the groundwater contamination will present a danger
through different routes of exposure to the city wellfield, private wells,
water pipes, and a general threat to the environment. The court found there
was no imminent or substantial endangerment to any of the avenues of
groundwater, through the evidence presented by the residents. The residents
also asserted an endangerment threat of vapor intrusion. The court found
that the vapor mitigation systems the company had installed in every
structure that exceeded the appropriate indoor air screening levels have
been successful in preventing any endangerment. “An endangerment claim
‘was designed to provide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the
risk of future “imminent” harms[]’” and the mitigation systems had already
accomplished this. The unmitigated structures and houses, and preferential
pathways, presented no serious health risk through vapor intrusion.
Arconic, Inc. v. Alcoa, Inc., No. 19-55181, 2020 WL 4579511 (9th Cir.
Aug. 10, 2020).
A refrigerants and solvents recycling company contaminated nearby soil
and ground water, and customers of this company were held responsible for
the cost of the clean-up process. Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), the group of
customers had three years to seek contribution for the cost of the
contamination from other entities that contributed to the contamination
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through owning property and operating businesses near the facility. These
parties settled with the group, and the group assumed the parties’
responsibilities for the site. Years later, the EPA learned of other
contaminations by this company from another facility and this group of
customers brought another suit against the same de minimis parties. The de
minimis parties claimed that the earlier settlement triggered the Act’s threeyear statute of limitations for contribution claims under a judiciary
approved settlement. The group of customers appealed after the District
Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in
favor of the de minimis parties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the
customer’s claims are not untimely because the first settlement can not be
characterized as covering the costs of the second clean up even if it the
remediation of the second clean-up was foreseen in the first suit. Under the
Act, the limitation period of a settlement is only for the response cost
imposed as a basis for seeking contribution. A statute of limitations may not
run or expire before a party has an opportunity to assert the claim, therefor
the limitation period of the Act starts upon the entry of a settlement
imposing a specific liability, not before.
This case focused on the procedural aspect of the statute of limitations
for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act.
MPM Silicones, LLC., v. Union Carbide Corp., 966 F.3d 200 (2d Cir.
2020).
Subsequent Owner sued Original Owner under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)
for reimbursement of money spent removing pollutants and future costs
associated with cleaning up pollutants. The district court held that the
recovery for remedial actions was barred by the statute of limitations and
entered a declaratory judgment that the Original Owner was responsible for
95% of future removal expenses. Both parties appealed. To determine the
statute of limitations under CERCLA, a party’s efforts to remove pollutants
are classified as remediations or removals. Remedial actions are permanent
remedies, whereas removal actions are defined as the “cleanup or removal
of released hazardous substances from the environment.” On appeal, the
Second Circuit emphasized that the definitions of remedial and removal
actions often overlap and the statutory definitions make it difficult to
distinguish between the two. The court follows the rule that removal actions
deal immediately with the source of an imminent threat to public health.
The court held that the Subsequent Owner’s responses to the pollution, such
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as an earthen cap and a diversion ditch, were remedial rather than removal.
The court reasoned that these actions are remedial because they were not
designed to eliminate an immediate threat, but instead mitigate any
potential harm caused by not containing pollutants. Further, the court
clarifies that subsequent actions on the same land may count as separate and
distinct remedial actions for statute of limitations purposes, correcting the
district court’s analysis. The court held that the Subsequent Owner’s actions
were correctly classified as remedial but are not barred by the statute of
limitations. Further, the court found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion to order the Original Owner to pay 95% of future remedial
actions and remands the case for proceedings consistent with its order.
State
Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll, 2020 MT 198.
Three Landowners filed six claims for adjudication of decreed water
rights after a dispute arose from a series of property conveyances. The basis
for these claims focused on the original decree of two historical water
rights, which later comingled to irrigate lands now owned by all parties.
Landowner-1 asserted ownership allocation based on the percentage of
historical irrigation of respective lands. Alternatively, Landowner-2
asserted ownership of both historical rights based on prior conveyance to
their predecessor. The water court found that both historical rights became
appurtenant to the respective lands through comingled irrigation and
therefore each landowner, through deeded language, is entitled to a pro-rata
share of the decreed rights on their respective properties. Additionally, the
water court found that absent water measurement records, flow rates for the
rights are equitably determined by the percentage of irrigated acreage on
each property. Landowner-2 motioned for post-judgment relief claiming the
water court over-allocated the flow rate awarded to Landowner-1 based on
previously undisclosed expert opinion. The water court found that the
opinion obtained by Landowner-2 did not warrant post-judgment relief, and
denied Landowner 2’s motion. Landowner-2 appealed to the Montana
Supreme Court, challenging (1) the water court’s method of interpreting the
conveyances, (2) the pro-rata allocation of the decreed rights, and (3) the
alleged misallocation of rights to Landowner 1. The court affirmed each
decision of the water court, employing contract principles to substantiate
the water court’s finding of clear intent from prior conveyances. Further,
the court ruled that the water court, based on lack of record, correctly
determined equitable flow rates and subsequent allocation thereof.
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United States v. State of Washington, Dept. of Ecology, No. C01-0047Z,
slip copy, 2020 WL 4756460 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 30, 2020).
Water Master provided his annual report for 2019-2020 to the court.
Water Master recommended that the Water User Fees (“Fees”) of both
Tribe and Landowners be waived for 2020-2021 (agreed to by Tribe,
Landowners, and Department). This is due to the financial hardships caused
by the Covid-19 pandemic. Water Master provided two justifications to
waive the Fees. First, Water Master’s account had enough funds to
withstand one year of nonpayment of Water Fees by both Tribe and
Landowners. This is in part because Water Master has maintained lower
operations costs than what were expected from the original 2007
agreement. Additionally, the interest gained from Water Master’s account
would help cover the operating costs. Second, Water Master suggested
waiving Fees instead of deferring because of the ongoing financial
uncertainty of Covid-19. Specifically, it is difficult to know whether
financial outlooks will be better when the deferred Fees would become due.
Water Master also suggested that the Department send letters explaining the
Fee waiver and including procedures for contacting Water Master if
Landowners believe these recommendations were incorrect. Additionally,
Water Master’s report included that Tribe paid its Fees for 2019-2020, but
that Landowners underpaid, and this underpayment should be added to
Landowner’s Fees for 2021-2022. The Department owed no payment for
2019-2020 per the settlement agreement. The court accepted Water
Master’s report and approved Water Master’s suggestion on August 17,
2020. Id. No. C01-47 TSZ, slip copy, 2020 WL 4747895
White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n, ex rel. State v. Minnesota Dep’t of Nat.
Res., 946 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 2020).
White Bear Lake Restoration Association (“Association”) sued
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) for declaratory and
injunctive relief for alleged violation of the Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act (“MERA”) and violation of public-trust doctrine stemming from
groundwater-appropriation permits that DNR had issued that caused the
lakes levels to fall below legal levels. The trial court found in favor of
Association on both grounds. DNR appealed and the court of appeals
reversed and remanded on both grounds. The Supreme Court of Minnesota
granted review and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that the legislature that had created structures for public
water use was to be prioritized and balanced, and because no private
encroachment or diversion to a separate state had occurred, the common-
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law public trust doctrine need not apply. The court held that Association
claims under MERA were merited and that they had stated claims upon
which relief could be granted because the alleged activities by the DNR
were covered by the “any conduct” language in the statute. Two justices
signed a concurrence and dissent, disagreeing that the “any conduct”
language was broad enough to provide a claim. Case remanded to appellate
court for a decision on the remaining issues on appeal.
Bates Energy Oil & Gas, LLC v. Complete Oil Field Servs., LLC, No. 5:17cv-808, 2020 WL 4677668 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2020).
(Note: this is largely a case of fraud and incidentally involves fracking
sand.)
Fracking sand supplier (“Supplier”) originally sued Purchaser over a
contract between the parties to provide fracking sand. Purchaser removed to
federal court and counter-sued, joining multiple parties related to Supplier
as Counter-Defendants (“Cohorts”) and alleging an elaborate scheme by
which the Supplier and many Cohorts jointly worked to defraud Purchaser
of hundreds of thousands of dollars from the escrow account set up for use
of the contracted parties. Supplier’s original suit was dismissed, and several
defendants in the counter suit settled, defaulted, or were dropped from the
claims, leaving the court to rule on its findings against the remaining nondefaulting Cohorts. Purchaser’s causes of action against non-defaulting
Cohorts addressed by the court are (1) fraud and conspiracy to commit
fraud, (2) theft and conspiracy to commit theft, (3) breach of fiduciary duty
and conspiracy to commit breach of fiduciary duty, (4) restitution or money
had and received, (5) conversion, and (6) attorney’s fees. The court found
for Purchaser on the counts of fraud, theft, and restitution, holding various
Cohorts jointly and severally liable for the Supplier’s fraud, for their share
of the stolen funds, and for individualized restitution depending on who
held the money. The court found Purchaser failed to establish fiduciary duty
or meet the elements for the tort of conversion, and the court declined to
rule on attorney’s fees pending a motion yet to be filed. The court
concluded by noting Texas’s one-satisfaction rule applies to this case
despite the litany of Supplier’s and Cohorts’ bad conduct because Purchaser
suffered only a single financial injury.
Elk Grove Dev. Co. v. Four Corners Cty. Water & Sewer Dist., No. 190599, 2020 WL 4462831 (Mont. Aug. 4, 2020).
Subdivision Developer filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent Water
District from using the subdivision’s water outside of the subdivision.
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Subdivision Developer possessed several covenants for the property. One of
the covenants gave Subdivision Developer control over the water in
dispute. Subdivision Developer moved for summary judgment arguing
“[t]he Covenants unambiguously restrict off-subdivision use of water.” At
the hearing on the motion, the district court decided two issues. First,
whether the covenant restricts the water supply to use within the
subdivision and if the covenant precluded any change to that right. Second,
whether the covenant was an “unreasonable restraint on alienation.” The
district court opined that the covenant was not unreasonable as it served its
intended purpose of protecting the subdivisions exclusive right to the water.
The district court granted the Subdivision Developer’s motion for summary
judgment and entered an injunction preventing the use of the subdivisions
water for uses outside of the subdivision. Water District appealed. The
Supreme Court reviewed the issue of whether the covenant was an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. The court disagreed with the district
court’s holding that the covenant was not unreasonable. The court
acknowledged the factors that the district court considered in their decision.
However, the court articulated that the factors do not carry as much weight
as statutes. Moreover, under Montana law, water belongs to the people and
should be used for public benefit. Therefore, although water may be held by
a party, “it is not ‘owned’ in the usual sense.” Parties who hold water rights
are to make use of the water which does not included the right to physical
ownership. Therefore, the court held that Water District is entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of whether the covenant was an
unreasonable restriction on alienation.
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LAND
Easement
Hardy v. United States, 965 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Central of Georgia Railway Company (“CGA”) operated a rail line
located within Landowner’s property. CGA applied with the Surface
Transportation Board (“STB”) to abandon a portion of the rail line.
Subsequently, the Newton County Trail Path Foundation (“NCTPF”)
reached an agreement with STB to establish recreational trails along the
abandoned rail line and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU).
Amidst negotiations, CGA mistakenly described the location of the rail line
but an amended description was accepted by NCTPF. Landowners sued the
United States (“Government”), alleging STB improperly approved a
conversion of railroad rights-of-way to recreational trails under the National
Trail Systems Act (“Trails Act”). Landowners contended that the deeds
executed with CGA were for an easement and CGA could not convey their
interest to NCTPF. The trial court granted summary judgment for
Landowners, ruling that the deeds conveyed only easements. The trial court
also found that the NITU constituted a temporary taking. On appeal,
Government argued that the deeds conveyed a fee simple interest in CGA
and Landowners lacked the requisite interest to allege a takings.
Additionally, Government argued that NITU did not affect a takings
because the erroneous description showed a lack of intent to abandon. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected
Government’s first argument and affirmed the trial court’s finding that
Hardy conveyed an easement. The appellate court relied upon authority
prioritizing the intent of the parties at conveyance and held that the
executed deeds were intended to act as a railroad right-of-way, not a fee
simple conveyance. Additionally, the appellate court vacated the trial
court’s finding that the NITU was a temporary taking for lack of evidence
regarding when Railroad would have abandoned the easements and
remanded for further proceedings.
DCP Sand Hills Pipeline, L.L.C. v. San Miguel Elec. Coop., No. 04-1900288-CV, 2020 WL 4607062 (Tex. App.-San Antonio August 12, 2020).
Company 2 sued Company 1 seeking a declaration that Company 1’s
easement was invalid, Company 2’s lignite lease was superior to the
easement, and a permanent injunction requiring Company 1 to move its
pipeline. Company 2 countersued that the lignite lease had expired and
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sought to condemn the land covered by the easement. The trial court
awarded summary judgement to Company 2, Company 1 appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgement on
the condemnation claim, but affirmed the remainder of the grant of
summary judgement. The appeals court affirmed the validity of the lease
because Company 2 was not seeking to establish possessory or ownership
rights to the land and the trespass to try title statute did not apply to this
claim. The appeals court reversed on the grounds that Company 2 had not
shown that the land covered by the easement was already devoted to a
public use as Company 2 had not applied for a mining permit at the time of
the installation of the pipeline. The appeals court also held that the
condemnation would not practically destroy or materially interfere with the
current use as the condemnation would affect at most 14.6% of the strip
mining potential of the land. The case was remanded for further
proceedings on the condemnation issue.
Other Use
Smith v. B&G Royalties, 2020 WY 106, 2020 WL 4783125 (Wyo. 2020).
Mineral Owner’s father owned mineral interest in a property in
Wyoming. In 1989, Mineral Owner’s father, through a warranty deed,
conveyed an undivided one-eighth interest to Company for all of minerals
from what the property produced. The deed mentioned no reservation of a
royalty interest. In 2017, Mineral Owner’s father died, and Mineral Owner
received the remaining interest. In 2018, Mineral Owner filed for
declaratory judgment and to quiet title to a 1.0417% royalty interest against
Company. Company filed a counterclaim seeking quiet title and a
declaratory judgment. Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Company. Mineral
Owner contended that the 1989 warranty deed conveyance did not include
the royalty interest because Mineral Owner’s father kept the interests
unbundled, which was the intention in the conveyance. On appeal,
Company requested attorneys’ fees and costs. The Wyoming Supreme
Court held that the 1989 warranty deed was unambiguous and subjected to
rules of contract interpretation. When conveying mineral interests, there
must expressed intent. The warranty deed’s plain language clearly did not
state a clear expression of retaining royalty interest. Due to the warranty
deed’s language, combined with no mention of the royalty interest, the
Mineral Owner was estopped from claiming anything less than the
unrestricted 1/8 interest originally conveyed. Company was not entitled to
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attorneys’ fees. Awarding of attorneys’ fees requires lack of a cogent
argument or failure to support the claims. Mineral Owner's brief was
sufficient to meet the requirement of a cogent argument. The court affirmed
the lowers court’s decision and declined to award attorneys’ fees.
Florida Rock Properties, Inc. v. Jemal’s Buzzards Point L.L.C., No. 18483, 2020 WL 4583523 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2020).
Developer owns and develops real estate (Developer’s Property) adjacent
to a former bulk fuel distribution terminal (the “Fuel Terminal Property”).
Developer brought this suit against Former Owners of the Fuel Terminal
Property, alleging that petroleum contamination from the Fuel Terminal
Property had migrated onto the Developer’s Property. Former Owners
brought indemnification and contribution claims against other companies.
Former Owners and Other Companies moved for summary judgment on
statute-of-limitations grounds.
The court held that the issue is ripe for summary judgment, because fact
discovery regarding “the statute of limitations issue” was completed.
Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations shall not begin to toll
until the injury is discovered or, with reasonable diligence, should have
been discovered. The discovery rule effectively creates a duty of inquiry,
and knowledge is deemed sufficient if the plaintiff has “reason to suspect”
that the defendant did something wrong. The court held that Developer
discovered or with reasonable diligence should have discovered its claims
in February 2000 when it received the Phase II report that identified the
Fuel Terminal Property as a likely source of the soil and groundwater
contamination.
However, Developer may still recover for injuries from injurious acts
committed within the limitations period, and it is Developer’s burden to
identify injurious action within the limitations period that caused harm.
Summary judgment is inappropriate as the full discovery of “migrationrelated issues” is not completed. So, the court granted in part and denied in
part Former Owners’ and Other Companies’ motions for summary
judgment.
Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214 (3d. Cir. 2020).
The Baptistes on behalf of a class of homeowners and renters brought
suit against the Bethlehem Landfill Company. Due to noxious odors and
other air contaminants coming from the landfill, the action claims
interference with the use and enjoyment of their homes and loss and
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property value. The action was brought under the following theories: (1)
public nuisance, (2) private nuisance, and (3) negligence.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
dismissed the complaint on the basis that there were too many residents in
the area similarly affected to sustain a private claim for public nuisance, the
odors affected too many people and the landfill was too far away from them
to constitute a private nuisance, and that the Baptistes had failed to identify
a duty of care to maintain a negligence claim.
The United States Court of Appeals found that the Baptistes sufficiently
alleged a “particular damage” to sustain a private claim for public nuisance
because they asserted their claims specifically on behalf of a class of
homeowners and not the community at large. The Appellate Court further
found that there existed no support under Pennsylvania law for rejecting a
private nuisance claim on the ground that the property affected was too far
from the alleged nuisance. Lastly, the Appellate Court reversed the District
Court’s dismissal on the negligence claim because there is no longer any
dispute Bethlehem had a common-law duty to operate the landfill in a
reasonable manner that avoids unreasonable harm to the Baptiste. The
United States Court of Appeals reversed the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s decision and remanded the action for
further proceedings.
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ELECTRICITY
Rate
Wal-Mart Stores E., LP v. State Corp. Comm’n, 844 S.E.2d 676 (Va. 2020).
Customer appealed from a State Corporation Commission (“SCC”) order
denying Customer’s petitions seeking SCC’s permission to aggregate the
demand of multiple locations to qualify to buy electricity from someone
other than the public utilities. This case involves a statute that gives SCC
discretion to authorize retail choice to nonresidential customers who
aggregate their demand to exceed five megawatts.
The SCC, in its decision, focused on the question of whether granting the
petitions would be consistent with public interest. SCC found that
Customer’s departure would cause an increased cost to remaining public
utility customers and could possibly lower the return for the public utility,
which would decrease their ability to credit or refund customers. SCC
concluded these outcomes were contrary to the public interest and denied
Customer’s petition.
Customer argued (1) that SCC didn’t use the term “public policy” in line
with legislative intent, (2) the factual record was insufficient for the SCC to
make their decision, and (3) SCC abused its discretion in denying
Customer’s motion for reconsideration. The Virginia Supreme Court held
that legislative intent shows that SCC has broad discretion and that they did
not abuse it with their decision regarding public policy. The court also held
that SCC is responsible for considering the factual record, is entitled to
draw conclusions contrary to those Customer made, and that the burden of
proof is not on SCC. Finally, the court held SCC did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion to reconsider, because Customer did not ask them to
reconsider a prior decision. Because SCC used its broad discretion
consistent with statutory authority, the court affirmed SCC’s order denying
Customer’s petition.
Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 964 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Petitioners, (“Utility Commissioners”) appealed a rehearing denial by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) over its passing of
Order(s) 841 and 841-A. 841, aimed to remove barriers to utility
distribution in the free market regarding electric storage technologies
(ESR), such as batteries. 841-A, prevented state and local authorities from
“broadly prohibit[ing] all retail customers from participating in RTO/ISO
markets”.
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The court began by establishing that the Utility Commissioners had
standing and that the issue was ripe for appeal. Regarding Utility
Commissioners’ claim that FERC exceeded its jurisdiction with 841, the
court made a three-part evaluation. First, did the prohibition “directly
affect[ ] wholesale rates?” Next, did FERC regulate state regulated
facilities? Lastly, the court must ensure that its determination does not
conflict with the APA’s “core purpose[ ]” of “curb[ing] prices and
enhance[ing] reliability in the wholesale electric market.”
The court determined that 841 does affect wholesale rates by opening up
the market to ESRs. The court held that 841 does not directly regulate
distribution systems which are under state jurisdiction, therefore, 841 does
not infringe on the rights guaranteed to states under the Federal Power Act
(FPA). However, through the Supremacy Clause, it is under FERC’s
jurisdiction to determine who participates in the wholesale markets. This
leaves states with the same authority they possessed prior to 841’s passing.
Finally, the decision did not foreclose judicial review should a conflict
arise between states and FERC. Next the court held that by passing 841,
FERC, was in accordance with law and it was not an abuse of its authority
due to the level of detail and issue awareness surrounding the passage of
841. The court held that Utility Commissioners failed to show that Order
841 and 841-A are not in compliance with the FPA’s bifurcation of state
and federal jurisdiction.
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TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS
Corporations
Keane Frac, LP, v. SP Silica Sales, LLC, No. 01-19-00847-CV, 2020 WL
4589751 (Tex. App. Aug. 11, 2020).
Note – This case seems to be procedural in nature. While it deals with
two companies regarding an alleged breach of contract for the purchase of
fracking sand it deals more on the application of an already settled question.
During the initial filing, the statutory interpretation of the Texas Citizens
Participation Act was quite broad and there were various splits amongst
appellate courts in Texas. However, prior to this case being settled the
Texas Supreme Court held on an extremely similar case in Creative Oil &
Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC. The court in that case found that a
certain phrase within the TCPA should be interpreted in a certain manner.
In this case, the appellate court is just applying the already established case
law of the Texas Supreme Court. While the Creative case dealt with a
singular well and this case handles fracking sand the section of the statute
in question is still the same. Summary Below
Completer appealed the decision of the lower court to deny their motion
to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (The “Act”), alleging
that their contract was related to their right of free speech about a matter of
public concern regarding goods in the marketplace. In the lower court,
Producer sued Completer alleging breach of contract, fraud, and fraudulent
inducement. Producer and Completer were previously in an agreement that
provided for Producer to supply Completer with a certain tonnage of
fracking sand monthly. The original agreement provided a credit system if
Producer failed to provide all the ordered sand from a certain plant that was
under construction but would be finished before the contract’s beginning.
Contract also provided a right of termination for Completer if Producer
failed to produce a certain amount on three separate occasions. Through the
first three months, the plant was not operational, and Completer had to
purchase the sand on a “spot market” rate with Producer providing the
difference in cost. The two companies then entered into a separate contract
to control their interactions due to Producer’s failures, altering the
agreement between the two. Completer later gave notice of termination and
Producer sued alleging the above. Completer moved to dismiss under the
Act. The trial court held that the act did not apply and the dismissal was
frivolous, awarding costs and fees to Producer. The appeals court found that
the Act did not apply, since the communications were only between the two
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parties and had no impact on outside groups. The court relied on established
caselaw regarding the interpretation of “in the marketplace” to arrive at this
outcome. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss but
overturned the award of costs and fees.
Patents / Intellectual Property
Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., No. 17-1555, No.
17-1626, 2020 WL 4743511 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 2020).
Appellant (“Bennett Regulator”) appealed to the Federal Circuit
following the loss of multiple claims in a patent dispute before the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board as well as the “adequacy” of the board’s sanctions
award against Appellee (“Atlanta Gas”) for failure to terminate its inter
partes review decision. Atlanta Gas cross-appealed to overturn the sanctions
award.
First, Bennett Regulator’s challenged the narrowness of the board’s
scope regarding four terms used within the claim. On each of the terms, the
court determined that there was a lack of intrinsic evidence in the record to
support appellant’s view and they were under no obligation to allow in
appellant’s extrinsic evidence, therefore upholding the Appeal Board’s
decision on this issue.
The second challenge accused the Patent Trial and Appeal Board of
violating the Administrative Procedures Act which was based upon the
Board’s duty to “make the necessary findings and have an adequate
‘evidentiary basis for its findings.’” The court determined that the Board
adequately examined the patent’s claim and held that its wording
purportedly conflicted with the testimony provided by Bennett Regulator.
Lastly, the court held that the award of sanctions against Atlanta Gas for
abuse of discretion in failing to provide adequate notice over issues
surrounding a merger/acquisition was outside of the court’s jurisdiction.
This was based on the sanctions order not being a final judgement by the
Board for lack of an award amount. Furthermore, the court declined to
exercise pendent jurisdiction in the sanctions award matter. The court
affirmed the Appeal Board’s’ finding that the patent was unpatentable and
remanded the case back to the Board to quantify the sanctions awarded in
light of the court’s opinion. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state (or federal) court rules should be consulted before citing the
case as precedent.
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ENVIRONMENTAL
Federal
Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. US Dep’t of the Interior, 965 F.3d 705 (9th
Cir. 2020).
Environmental Center sued the US Department of the Interior
(Department) after Department failed to conduct a new NEPA report prior
to the 2017 lease sale, violating its own regulations. In 2012, Department
conducted an environmental impact statement (EIS) and claimed that was
sufficient to satisfy NEPA for this sale. The district court granted summary
judgment to the Department in full. Environmental Center appealed,
claiming the EIS was inadequate for the 2017 lease sale. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court in full, holding the 2012 EIS to include the 2017
sale. The court held that nothing in their case law prevented a
programmatic-level EIS from also serving as a site-specific analysis needed
for NEPA, and cited several examples of that actually being expressly
allowed. In this case, the court held that the type of analysis used in the
2012 EIS may qualify given the right factual circumstances. The court
rejected both an approach that solely looked at the NEPA adequacy to
decide if an action separated by time from the initial EIS because it makes
the statute of limitations meaningless in certain situations and an approach
that looks at deviation from the underlying plan or program because the
tiering regulations assume that site-specific studies would also be
conducted. Rather, the court held that the initial EIS ought to be examined
to see if it purported to be the EIS for a subsequent action because it
provides insight into what the agency was planning to do as a result of the
EIS. NEPA regulations require EISs to carefully define the proposals under
consideration. In this case, the defined scope of the study was nebulous but
the court found it reasonable that it considered future lease sales and
questions of its adequacy for that purpose were time barred.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 18-CV-4596
(VEC), 2020 WL 4605235 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2020).
Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) sued U.S. Department of
Interior (“DOI”) after DOI issued a memorandum fundamentally altering
the agency’s interpretation of “takings” and “killings” under the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (“MTBA”). This policy shift eliminated any legal
consequence for incidental “takings” and “killings” reversing almost five
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decades policy interpretation by DOI. NRDC sued to vacate the
memorandum and the guidance given in reliance on the memorandum.
NRDC argued that DOI interpretation of the MTBA was in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). NRDC moved for summary
judgement and DOI cross-moved. The court granted NDRC motion for
summary judgement and subsequently denied DOI cross motion for several
reasons. First, DOI’s memorandum read into the MTBA a “mens rea”
component that does not exist in the act. Second, DOI should not be given
deference because the memorandum was “a recent and sudden departure
from long-held agency positions”, as well as “an informal pronouncement
lacking notice-and-comment” and, that there “is no evidence of input from
the agency actually tasked with implementing the statute.” Third, that
legislative history did not indicate congress intended for the MTBA to be
read so narrowly. Finally, the court found that the memorandum violated
the APA and that vacatur was necessary. Memorandum Vacated and
remanded to DOI for further proceedings.
New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 964 F.3d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
New York petitioned EPA to find that power-generating and other
facilities in nine different States violated the Good Neighbor Provision
(“GNP”) by producing emissions that significantly contributed to New
York’s difficulty attaining or maintaining compliance with the 2008 and
2015 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone. EPA denied the
petition because it failed to meet the standard for establishing a violation of
the GNP.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
EPA’s reasons for rejecting New York’s petition were arbitrary and
capricious in two ways. First, EPA did not give a good reason as to why
New York’s petition failed, and their test demanded an impossible showing
from New York, requiring a detailed comparison of all known and
unknown pollution sources.
Second, EPA incorrectly interpreted the Clean Air Act by evaluating
downwind air quality at a time past the statutory deadline, when it should
be evaluated at that deadline. EPA also incorrectly tried to say that states
can only challenge interstate transport of pollution within their geographical
borders, when New York should be able to challenge since they are part of
a multistate nonattainment area. The circuit court vacated and remanded
EPA’s decision for further proceedings.
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POET Biorefining, LLC v. EPA, No. 19-1139, 2020 WL 4745274 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 14, 2020).
Cellulosic Biofuel Producer (“Producer”) petitioned for review of EPA’s
guidance on the measuring methods for cellulosic biofuel as regulated by
EPA’s Pathways II Rule. Pathways II Rule requires certification of
cellulosic biofuel by either, the voluntary consensus standard body
(“VCSB”) method or a peer-review method. Cellulosic biofuel is a
renewable fuel promoted by the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard
program. Following EPA’s implementation of Pathways II Rule, biofuel
producers’ measurements indicated significant variation, so EPA issued
guidance to help explain the requirements for certification.
Producer registered for cellulosic-biofuel Renewable Identification
Numbers using measurements certified by the peer-review method; but
EPA denied Producer’s request because Producer did not “reasonably
approximat[e] the amount of cellulose that is actually being converted into
fuel.” Producer argued EPA’s guidance lacked proper notice and comment,
imposed arbitrary requirements that could not be met, and disregarded the
Pathways II Rule. As there are two methods to achieve cellulosic biofuel
certification, by VCSB or peer-review, the D.C. Circuit Appellate Court
evaluated each method separately.
First, the court dismissed, for lack of ripeness, the discussion of VCSBcertified method because no method exists. Second, the court held the peerreview method was ripe for review
because EPA denied Producer’s registration that utilized the peer-review
method. Third, the court established jurisdiction, under the Clean Air Act,
because EPA’s peer-review guidance reflects a settled agency stance.
Fourth, the court held EPA’s guidance is interpretive because EPA further
explained an existing rule, the Pathways II Rule, and its requirements for
certification. Therefore, the guidance did not require notice or comment.
Fifth, EPA’s guidance was reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious, and in
accordance with the Pathways II Rule because it demonstrates how biofuel
producers obtain accurate results through the peer-review method. The
court dismissed the petition in part and denied in part.
Clean Wisconsin v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 964 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Public health and environmental organizations, municipal governments,
and State of Illinois petitioned for review of area attainment designations
promulgated under Clean Air Act (CAA) by Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
involving control for ozone.
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For jurisdiction, the court held both environmental petitions and
governmental petitions have Article III standing, because environmental
harms that constitute cognizable injuries including: (1) reduced aesthetic
and recreational values of the area; (2) adverse health effects of asserting
realistic health concerns; (3) the health and economic costs of increased
pollution.
On the merits, as EPA has (1) treated similarly-situated areas differently,
(2) drawn conflicting conclusions from the same data, (3) had
inconsistencies in the record and conflicting characterizations of data, and
(4) centrally relied on one apparently mistaken interpretation of data, the
court held that alleged EPA’s designations, except designation of Lake
County, are arbitrary and capricious. The court held the EPA must provide
further explanation showing how the evidence supports its attainment
designation or make a different designation if it concludes on reexamination that the evidence so requires. The court denied EPA’s request
for voluntary remand because the permission of voluntary remand will
violate the Clean Air Act’s statutory deadline.
As there is a possibility that EPA will be able to substantiate the relevant
designations on remand, the court remanded the unlawful attainment
designations to EPA, instead of vacating them.
R.L. Vallee, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transportation, No. 5:18-CV-104, 2020
WL 4689788, (D. Vt. July 8, 2020).
Three entities (collectively “Companies”) sued Vermont Agency of
Transportation (“VTrans”) and Federal Highway Agency (“FHWA”)
challenging FHWA’s approval of VTrans’s highway redesign project
(“Project”). Companies claimed VTrans failed to prepare an environmental
impact statement before approval. VTrans and FHWA claimed an
environmental impact statement was unnecessary because the proposed
Project qualified for a categorical exclusion (“CE”). Both parties moved for
summary judgment. In support of their motion, Companies argued Project
did not qualify for CE and VTrans failed to include a nearby store’s permit
application to build a gas station in its assessment of foreseeable impacts.
The court considered each argument to determine if FHWA’s approval of
Project was arbitrary or capricious. The court found FHWA’s approval to
be reasonable based on: (1) Project’s impact on traffic flow is to be
minimal, (2) revisions to regulations did not apply during approval because
only regulations in effect apply at time of decision, (3) language in
VTrans’s application effectively met the requirement of ensuring no
significant environmental effects will result, and (4) highway improvements
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to improve safety and traffic flow were not automatically ineligible for CE.
The court also found the store’s application to build a gas station was not a
foreseeable impact because Project was not a cause of store’s application
being approved, but a condition precedent. The court denied companies’
motion for summary judgement and granted VTrans’s and FHWA’s motion
for summary judgment, overall finding FHWA’s approval was not arbitrary
or capricious.
State
Crouzet v. First Baptist Church of Stonington, 199 Conn. App. 532, 2020
WL 4743006 (Conn. App. Ct. Aug. 18, 2020).
Crouzet brought this action to recover damages for environmental
contamination of certain real property against the First Baptist Church of
Stonington. Crouzet is alleging (1) the ongoing contamination of the his
soil, and the basement of his property, (2) liability pursuant to Connecticut
General Statute 22a-16, (3) trespass, (4) private nuisance, (5) liability under
Connecticut General Statute 22a-451, and (6) breach of contract. The trial
court ruled in favor of the First Baptist Church of Stonington and the
question on appeal was whether the trial court’s factual findings that the
Church’s had shown the secondary contamination is clearly erroneous in
light of expert testimony and the factual bases for such testimony.
The Appellate Court found that the only expert presented who had the
opinion that there was the possibility of a secondary source of
contamination was based on speculation. The Court proceeded to rule the
expert’s opinion as a non-supportive conclusion of a secondary source.
Further, the Court found that even if there was some evidentiary basis for
the secondary contamination, the findings do not support the conclusion
that Crouzet failed to prove the Church caused the contamination beneath
his house. The Court noted that the existence of a secondary source of
contamination did not mean that Crouzet failed to provide evidence that the
Church could be a source of contamination, but that it might impact the
damages to which he may be awarded.
Finally, the Appellate Court found that the trial court’s finding that the
Church proved a secondary source of the pollution in Crouzet’s basement
has no bearing regarding the pollution that continues to exist outside of his
basement. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court improperly
rendered judgement in favor of the Church.
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S. D. Petroleum Release Compensation Fund v. BP plc, 2020 SD 47, 2020
WL 4689455.
South Dakota Petroleum Release Compensation Fund (“FUND”) sought
recovery payments from Energy Company for costs associated with
cleaning up environmental contamination from underground petroleum
storage tanks (“UST”). FUND also sought to recover payments made to
third parties for cleanup costs of Energy Company’s other USTs. FUND
alleged theories of (1) misrepresentation, (2) subrogation rights, (3) unjust
enrichment, (4) fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation, (5) fraud,
(6) strict liability, and (7) recovery of litigation costs. The circuit court
granted Energy Company’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.
FUND appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the
circuit court’s decision. First, FUND failed to prove Energy Company had a
right of recovery for cleanup costs from its insurers. FUND identified no
policy indemnifying Energy Company for cleanup costs or covering
cleanup costs at the UST sites at issue, therefore, FUND cannot recover
payments based on fraud, unjust enrichment, or misrepresentation if it
cannot establish damages. Second, all but one of the third-party payment
claims were time barred by statute. FUND failed on the remaining thirdparty payment claim to establish Energy Company was responsible for
cleanup costs. At the time of contamination, Energy Company did not own
the UST site at issue and a federal agency determined Energy Company
was not the responsible party for cleanup costs at said UST site. Therefore,
Energy Company was not strictly liable for the cleanup of UST sites. Last,
because FUND failed to recover on any of its claims, FUND could not
recover litigation costs. The court affirmed circuit court’s order of summary
judgment for Energy Company.
2627 LLC v. The Valley’s Plan. Council, Inc., No. 1838, 2020 WL 4673887
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 12, 2020).
(This case is likely procedural.)
Conservationists resisted Developer’s plan to build four homes in a
historic district Conservationists argued that Developer’s plan was like a
denied plan in 2004 (not associated with Developer). The administrative
law judge (“judge”) approved the plan, finding that res judicata did not
apply because the two plans were sufficiently different. Additionally, judge
found that he was legally unable to rule on the project’s impact on the
historic district. The Board of Appeals approved the project, but the Circuit
Court denied the application solely for collateral estoppel. Developer
appealed. The court faced four issues. First, Developer’s plan was not
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barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because the plan was
sufficiently distinct from the 2004 plan. Specifically, Developer’s plan
featured fewer houses on less land, included a different portion of the
historic district and did not include the historic building, and the houses
would be built on a less severe grade. Second, the judge improperly
dismissed his ability to determine if Developer’s plan would affect the
historic district. The law still requires judges to determine potential impact
even after some statutory protections were removed. Third, the judge made
a reasonable determination of the stormwater management system’s
effectiveness based on the parties’ expert witness. Fourth and finally, the
judge improperly accepted the county’s prima facie approval of the
panhandle lots. Conservationists provided evidence and witnesses to
question the lot’s ability to meet all requirements; therefore, the county or
Developer should have presented evidence on the lot’s adequacy before
they were approved. The circuit court’s holding on collateral estoppel was
vacated, and the case was remanded to determine the impact on the historic
district & the adequacy of the panhandle plots. This case is an unpublished
opinion, therefore state or federal rules should be consulted before citing it
as precedent.
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